\The KMT and Science in China

Science and Technology in China 4910C

Fall 1999 Washington University

Essay Two: The Three I’s of the Kuomintang’s science efforts

B Y K E V I N H O

(7 October 1999)

Once the Kuomintang (KMT) consolidated power in 1928, they came to represent the ‘state’ in Republican China. However, in addition to consolidating political leadership in China, the KMT moved to consolidate scientific efforts in China into a single goal-directed entity that served China’s needs in development. Again along alphabetical lines, then, the KMT’s involvement directing science in China can be thought of as the Three I’s—ideological leadership, institutional development that allowed for industrial development and the pursuit of international involvement in Chinese economic development. The approach was a top-down and goal directed one that depended on the co-optation of scientists and the cooperation of the scientific community in Republican China. Eventually, the line between scientific development and economic development became deliberately blurred as part of the KMT-directed “national defense economy.” I would argue that the KMT was most successful at consolidating ideology and creating the institutions necessary to facilitate economic growth, but lacked the time and money to accomplish the goals of industrial development and inviting foreign investment. It remains important to note that the KMT was not acting within a vacuum. As we have discussed before, there were other forces at work in China at the time that should be kept in mind. These influences included the presence of Western philanthropic organisations and the influence of growing tensions between China and Japan, but our focus here is the KMT. Despite changing policies and circumstances confronting China throughout the Republican Era, the ideal of turning China into a powerful and assertive nation through scientific and technological prowess was ever present. Therefore, it becomes an interesting problem to see how strongly this ethic was pushed by the KMT on Chinese scientists as a function of the circumstances that China found herself.

In the early 1900s Reardon-Anderson points out that there was no market for scientists and science in China, and that until after 1905 most students in government schools were “distracted by the lure of classical studies,” which would assure students a government job. (Reardon-Anderson 1991, 61) However, after the first generation of Boxer Indemnity scientists returned from their studies abroad and as scientific institutions became more sophisticated, an influx of science hit China by the 1920s. Science went from being a non-marketable field into a dynamic field filled with potential. With this new influx came the questions of where to take science, of which sciences to promote, and what purposes science should be used for. Ideological debates took place in the pages of various emergent scientific journals and at conferences, gradually science became politicized as the potential for the development of a modern China via science was realized. (see Reardon-Anderson 91-93) Therefore, science up until the KMT consolidation can be thought of a loosely confederated group of scientists working with different intentions and purposes that all generally went towards the vague goal of improving China.

This all changed significantly in 1928 as the KMT victory produced a “government determined to place science and technology at the service of the nation.” (Reardon-Anderson 177) Added to this crystallization of a science-oriented national policy was the influx of the second generation of scientists returning from abroad. One of the realizations the KMT arrived at early on in its history was that modernization and creating a strong state entailed an economic base that relied on science to foster industry and self-defense. (see Gasster 45, Kirby 1989, 25, Reardon-Anderson 190) Institutionally the KMT government pursued this policy by creating several organizations such as the Academia Sinica, the Peking Academy and various other research institutes and universities to coordinate and direct scientific efforts in the country. Such organizations as the National Institute for Compilation and Translation were established to promote and facilitate the importation of Western science into China. Eventually the Ministry of Education was characterized as being the most “powerful and purposeful” exponent of educational reform that China had known. This was evidenced by the fact that by 1937 more than half of Chinese college students had majored in a science or applied scientists. (Reardon-Anderson 181 & 190) Also interesting was the fact that government also promoted a certain type of idealism that appealed to the “brain drain” scientists to return to China to help build up the country.

The early ideological debate went on to become the full-fledged debate between the May Fourth liberals and the Kuomintang conservatives within the government. Eventually, this debate was resolved by the government only funding practical and applied science. This was reflected in the allocation of resources (i.e. money and research initiatives) by the Ministry of Education towards applied science. Indeed, specific regulations implemented in 1929, 1933 and 1935, even dictated that a certain proportion of Chinese university level students had to major in a natural or applied science. (see Reardon-Anderson 215) While the Ministry of Education was tightening up the educational infrastructure by pushing science education throughout the curriculum, other government agencies hampering overall progress by going off in different directions. An awareness o this emerges in a 1929 annual report that cited that different parts of the government were spending their allocations on their own “pet projects” that lacked coordination. (Kirby 1984, 82) Bearing this in mind we see that there was need for central planning to achieve modernization for China. This planning took place the early 1930s.

As science became more sophisticated and as concerns over Japan grew, the government began to push science towards pragmatic concerns. The KMT did so by creating such organizations such as the National Defense Planning Commission, which was founded in 1932 after the Kwantung Division of the Japanese Army had seized Manchuria in 1931. The commission was headed by the noted geologist Weng Wen-hao, which was characteristic of the KMT’s predilection for including technical specialists in its planning apparatuses. (Kirby 1984, 78) These organizations, such as the National Economic Council and the Independent Critic the reflected the diversity of the KMT and included various political opinions and expert scientists who despite sharing differences in opinion, were working towards the common KMT goal of developing a strong China. Eventually, these organizations laid out plans to build up such physical plant as steel works or power plants that were to aid in the development of specific industries and public works. (see Kirby 1984, 96) The thought being that centralized planning through agendas like the Three-Year Plan was essential to rapid and directed industrial development.

By developing the Geological Institute within the auspices of the Ministry of Industry and having entities as the National Resources Commission the KMT government was paving the way for industry as well foreign investment in China’s vast previously untapped mineral resources. (Yang 70) However, these efforts weren’t terribly successful. The Eurasia Aviation Corporation is used by Kirby as an example of the culmination of KMT efforts of a state-owned entity that had close ties with foreign interests, in this case German airline interests. Kirby also highlights the how Eurasia corporation was an example of an entity that became hamstrung due to inter-governmental bureaucracy. (Kirby 1984, 76) But generally, the type of deal that was struck with the Germans (and other Western countries) was one based on barter. An example of this deal was that the Germans would give the Chinese the technical knowledge and the on-site aid needed to develop a weapons industry among others, in exchange for tungsten mining rights in China. (Ibid, 212) In addition to the “extortionism” the state showed towards private enterprise in Shanghai, Kirby offers that Nanking consciously directed foreign investment towards state run enterprises. Foreign investment and domestic capital often fell short of expectations and the well-developed plans never came to fruition. This was not only due to a lack of confidence on the part of Chinese investors out of fears that their investment would become nationalized, but out of war with Japan starting in 1937.