Chinese and Soviet Science, ca 1960

Science and Technology in China 4910C

Fall 1999 Washingon University

Essay Three: Sino-Soviet Scientific Collaboration

B Y K E V I N H O

(4 November 1999)

The Sino-Soviet scientific relationship during 1949-1965 was one of pragmatic mutual benefit that was not wholeheartedly forthcoming. The two parties were isolated and united by a superficial common commitment to Marxist-Leninist ideology but were really more united together by a substantial contest with the United States. As with Soviet military contributions to China, Soviet scientific contributions to the Chinese were not forthcoming. Also, there must have been a certain Chinese instinct or intuition that told them that Sino-Soviet collaboration would not be permanent nor could it be counted on as being as such. Perhaps, this notion arises from the fact that Western science had left a firm imprint on the Chinese setting by the time of the Communist Revolution in 1949. In the realm of science, instead of sharing cutting-edge technology, the Soviets gave the Chinese outdated plans or machinery to the Chinese or failed to deliver on their promises. On an abstract level though, Soviet prowess did change fundamental scientific organization and perceptions of science in China.

The debate from Republican period of ‘practical’ science versus ‘pure’ science was settled in favor of the former by the time of the first Five-Year Plan of the CCP. Chinese scientists of the Communist period were much more deliberate at acquiring as much as they could from the Soviets before the 1960 Sino-Soviet split. This might due to the fact that during the Republican Era there were plenty of Western countries willing to impart scientific and technological knowledge to the Chinese. During PRC period, though, access to these external sources was severely constricted. Additionally, China faced a “brain drain” to Taiwan and imposed isolation by the Western powers. Therefore, the Soviets filled the former role of the West initially, but by 1965 official government policy espoused “self-reliance.” But by 1965, the regime had little choice but to espouse self-reliance because the situation with the Soviets was beyond reconciliation.

According to Reardon-Anderson, during the early stages of Communist Period there was no strong desire to change scientific organization from the Republican Era. The Republican institutions—Acedemia Sinica and the National Academy of Peking—remained intact. Also intact was the notion that science had value to Chinese society, and that value was both practical and necessary. The legacy of Western scientific contributions also remained. There remained a small pool of Western-trained Chinese scientists who were now at the disposal of the communists. Physical plant from such sources as the Rockefeller Foundation was nationalized. Wu and Sheeks point out that well over $100 million of U.S. scientific and educational assets in China became nationalized in 1949. (Wu & Sheeks, 221) Due to heavy Chinese losses in Korea at the hands of superior Western weapons, the resulting CCP commitment to the maxim of developing science to the level of Western science was extreme. There is not much said about the compatibility of the remaining Western-trained scientists and the new CCP regime, but it is telling that Reardon-Anderson compares the difference between the KMT and the CCP approach to science like the difference between gloves and brass knuckles. (Reardon-Anderson, 339) Indeed, until very recently, the Communists dogmatically assumed and adhered to the precept that science would serve the country and the people. Therefore, the development of science in Communist China became a mechanism of competition vis-a-vis the West.

Soviet contributions were mixed to this contest: some were downright bizarre as illustrated by the fixation with Lysenkoism, while others were more substantial, as demonstrated by the Soviets providing access to Western scientific literature. Reardon-Anderson goes on to provide us with most of the logistical contributions of the Soviets. Perhaps most fundamental change was the reorganization of the Academy of Sciences along Soviet lines. The Soviet system separated research from universities and placed the prerogative on regional research institutes. The system was a segregated top-down command research organization that was run by non-informed political leaders that, arguably, squelched genuine scientific innovation. (see Reardon-Anderson, 8-22) During the early stages of Sino-Soviet cooperation the Chinese gleaned the Soviet system of education; received more than 45,000 research journals and titles from the Soviet Academy of Sciences; hosted thousands of Soviet advisers and professors who ‘advised’ the Chinese; and sent hundreds of students each year to the U.S.S.R to receive formal scientific training and education. Wu and Sheeks add to this by discussing the large heavy industrial investment the Soviets had in China as well. The Soviets promised to re-build (or build) 141 Chinese state enterprises that consisted of chemical industry development, electrical development, among many others. (see Wu and Sheeks, 187) The Soviets had also sent more than 10,000 sets of specifications to China by 1960. (Wu and Sheeks, 202)

In addition these logistical contributions, Soviet political ideals now made their presence felt in the Chinese context. Science and scientists became politicized along Marxist principles. The persistent “class struggle” and the issue of how ‘red’ a scientist was, combined with the notion of a bourgeoisie Western science, stigmatized Western-trained scientists in the 1950s through 1978. The prime example of this politicization of science in China was the introduction of Soviet Lysenkoism. As Schneider warns, Lysenkoism serves both as a cautionary tale of combining philosophic or ideological commitment to science and as an example of the counter-productivity of extensive government involvement in science. The bizarre tenets of Lysenkoism, teaching winter wheat to grow in summertime, or that nature was malleable, had a particular appeal to the Chinese at this time. (see Schneider 45-9) Lysenkoism was not accepted whole sale by scientists in China, as evidenced with Schneider’s discussion of the Ministry of Agriculture. However, Lysenkoism was accepted as a structure for science because of its pragmatic approach to science, nature was subject to the will of men. It must have been an alluring fiction to the Chinese at this time who were bent on getting quick results for the betterment of the nation. Lysenkoism was an uncompromising ideology that refuted debate and denounced scientists who were of a different opinion. The Lysenkoists could do so because they manipulated newly created Soviet institutions such as the Chinese Academy of Sciences Institute of Genetics along with using Party connections as well. As time went on, this fantastical science conflicted too greatly not only with common sense, but also with the Stalinist mode of economic production, in which concrete results were needed.

The success of the atomic bomb project illustrates that the Chinese did not simply adhere to the Soviet structures they imported, but instead bypassed the Soviet style system at times, which allowed for innovation. The Soviets were to provide the Chinese with a nuclear reactor, a cyclotron and fissionable material. (Lewiss and Xue, 41) These accords also included a geological survey for uranium in exchange for the Chinese supplying raw materials to the Soviets. In the initial stages of the nuclear project Chinese scientists and planners stressed the need for the “vigorous assistance” of the Soviets. (Ibid., 48) The Soviets, according to Davis and Xue, felt compelled to give the Chinese more than they were comfortable in doing, because their position among socialist countries was deteriorating. (Ibid., 62) This distaste for collaborating with the Chinese was illuminated by the swiftness of the Soviet pullout, in terms of advisers and transmission of information, from China after 1960. Even during the exchange the director of the bomb project, Nie Rongzhen, noted that the Soviets were only supplying “outmoded” equipment to the Chinese all along—by 1959 Soviet aid had become “untrustworthy.” (Wang, 69 & 72) The success of the project stemmed from that fact that it was not run along Soviet lines. Nie was allowed far greater flexibility within his organization by the central authorities and subsequently allowed Chinese scientists to be a “little bolder” than their Soviet counterparts. (Reardon-Anderson, 45) This mentality of adopting non-Soviet methods proved to be the source of innovation and success in China.

The Soviets directly aided Chinese scientists with the deployment of Russian experts and advisers, blueprints, machinery and scientific journals; the Chinese also indirectly pushed for scientific growth out of intrinsic strategic concerns. Of course, the focus of these concerns was the perceived threat of atomic weapons, initially from the United States, and later from the Soviets themselves. As early as 1957, the Chinese were well aware of the changing Soviet position; this fear was crystallized with the Soviets and the Americans reaching a non-proliferation agreement. The relationship deteriorated as time moved on and tensions between the Chinese and their former allies the Soviets grew worse. After the split, science in China was left up to the Chinese, ironically enough; the goal of “self-reliance” was achieved. The following period would be one of counterproductive populist science and general decline that would last until Deng Xiaoping’s reforms in 1978.